From Nuclear Fuel via ArmsControlWonk, yet more embarassing A.Q. Khan-related revelations for Europe's export control authorities:
After the late 1970s, when intelligence agencies in the Urenco countries—Germany, the Netherlands, and the U.K.—confirmed that Pakistani scientist Abdul Qadeer Khan had been trying to supply Pakistan’s fledgling uranium enrichment program by contacting firms used by Urenco in outsourcing engineering services and purchasing equipment, members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) began identifying procurement channels and equipment sought by the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) and affiliated procurement organizations. Those organizations then “resorted more and more to ordering large amounts of junk to hide the stuff they were really trying to get,” one government analyst said last month.
In some cases, officials said, KRL began by ordering from foreign suppliers a small number of items it needed for centrifuge-building together with similar, but not identical, items. That tactic hid the sensitive goods and established a record of credibility with customs agencies in countries where the goods were shipped. “Once the initial shipments got through customs, KRL would then just order the items they wanted,” one official said.
Clever, I suppose, but not especially sophisticated. Certainly you would've hoped it would take more than a simple scheme like this to defeat the export controls of multiple European governments. Then again, there are at least some indications this was less negligence and more poorly-conceived policy.
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