3:33 Steven Goldman, director of the BIS Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, introduces the panel: David Nelson of State’s Office of Terrorism and Economic Sanctions Policy, Noah Zaring from the China desk at State, and director of the Office of National Security and Technology Transfer Controls at BIS Bernard Kritzer.
3:37 SG: “India has modified its approach, has made major commitments, in many respects commitments that exceed those of our closest allies” and the US has responded in a manner to demonstrate our satisfaction with India’s actions.
3:39 Confidence in strategic trade spurs overall trade. In FY05, the US exported $6.1 billion of goods to India of which $225 million (3.7%) was licensed and $7.6 million (0.12%) denied. That’s based on 1408 applications, 1029 approvals, 76 denials, and 303 RWA’d.
3:42 US distinguishes between ISRO entities primarily involved in satellite work, which were removed from the Entity List, and those mainly involved in launch, which remain on the list.
3:45 Advancing the US relationship with India is a top priority of Undersecretary McCormick.
3:47 Switching gears to from shiny new friend India, who we’re rewarding, to forlorn old pal Canada, who we’re screwing to finally comply with legislation enacted by Congress back when Tom Foley was Speaker of the House.
3:48 Change in missile technology controls on exports to Canada is not driven by a perception that Canada is a strategic threat, but rather by legislative mandate. BIS and other agencies are discussing the possibility of an expedited licensing procedure.
3:52 BIS projects that new rule requiring a license for chemical/biological equipment to all non-Australia Group countries will generate an additional 500 license applications per year.
3:54 Nelson takes the podium. His office coordinates modifications to bilateral economic sanctions policies and oversees the review of applications referred from Commerce.
3:58 Cuba and North Korea – equally evil as last year
3:59 Syria – yet more evil than last year
4:04 Iran – even the Europeans think these guys are pretty evil
4:06 Sudan – ambiguous, yet evil.
4:08 Libya, significantly less evil (but no timeline for removal of remaining barriers to normalization)
4:10 Zaring takes the baton
4:15 China should look beyond just oil and take a broader view of the overall situation in Sudan.
4:18 Chinese nonproliferation enforcement is lacking, but legal underpinnings are good. (We've heard that before.)
4:21 Kritzer’s turn
4:22 Processing time for 1600 licenses for China last year is under 60 days for the first time in many years…special comprehensive licenses…exceptions…why do I feel like we’re being buttered up only to soon be tossed in the saute pan.
4:28 Total value of US exports to China in 2004: $33 billion, $546 of which was licensed (largely chemicals, chemical manufacturing equipment, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and high performance computers)
4:37 Expects to resolve interagency review within next 30 days on “conventional catch-all” and to publish a proposed regulation with request for comments sometime in December
4:38 Q: Please comment on Defense Science Board semiconductor report (pdf). A: We are reviewing the study and will meet soon with other agencies on next steps.
4:39 Q: Will there be a list of names provided of the military end-users due to the new catch-all regs? Can they be published in Mandarin? A: We have no plans to publish a list in the Chinese language. Remember that this is an end-use control, not an end-user control (which implies that there won’t be a list).
4:41 Q: What are the odds of approval for an India deemed export license? A: Depends on the scope of the data and who it’s being released to.
4:43 Q: Why can’t the new Canada missile tech rule apply only to military items? A: That’s not what the law requires.
4:44 Q: (WRT Canada MT rule) Why not change the legislation rather than implement it? A: Such a good idea, we already thought of it ourselves. The administration’s proposed bill did not include this restriction, but Congress decided not to enact it into law.
4:46 Q: Can you give us an update on Pakistan? A: Regarding “equal treatment” vis a vis India – India has agreed to a range of concrete steps that Pakistan has not (e.g. commitment to MTCR and NSG standards)
4:50 Q: Why hasn’t the Country Chart (pdf, p. 13) been updated to reflect that EAR99 can’t go to Syria No License Required? A: It needs to be updated. Right now we’re working off a general order. Food and medicine not on the CCL may go to Syria NLR.
4:52 Q: With China fourth as a US export market, who’s first, second, and third? A: Probably Canada, Mexico, and Japan.
4:53 Q: What’s up with US policy toward Venezuela? A: Not surprised that “deep concern” about Chavez is reflected in agency recommendations to Commerce when reviewing applications.
4:55 Q: Which license applications go to the president? A: 1999 National Defense Authorization Act requires that CCL items which contribute to Chinese missile technology must be approved by the president. It’s a rare and very protracted process.
4:59 Q: Should we treat Hong Kong the same as China? A: No, they are different. The US has a special relationship with Hong Kong. Watch out if the Hong Kong consignee is sending the item to China for further processing.
Note: Kritzer’s PowerPoint includes a slide with the most unambiguous public summary yet of what some have referred to as the “China catch-all”, but which BIS officials are calling the “conventional catch-all”. It reads, verbatim, as follows:
Conventional Catch-All
- Will implement Wassenaar “Statement of Understanding”
- Will require a license for exports of uncontrolled items when the exporter knows they are destined for a “military end use”
- Will apply to countries on which the United States maintains an arms embargo
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